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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
GLADE STEVENS, MILTON STEVENS, 
AND MARGARET STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
000O000 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of the Fourth 
District Court, entered subsequent to an earlier Decree of 
Divorce, dividing the assets of the parties, establishing support 
obligations and ordering costs and attorneys fees. No Cross-
Appeal has been filed. Appellant has cited six errors as 
follows: (1) Whether the Court erred in failing to submit 
written findings with regard to the value of each of the 
contested items of property of the marital estate; (2) Whether 
the Court erred in failing to set a dollar figure on the 
Respondent's income; (3) Whether there was a fair and equitable 
division of the property of the parties; (4) Whether the award 
of child support and alimony was adequate; (5) Whether the order 
concerning medical and dental costs is adequate; and (6) Whether 
it was error for the Court to refuse to award costs incurred in 
obtaining an appraisal of the farming and trucking businesses 
owned by the parties. 
STATUTORY AND RULES PROVISIONS 
Section 21-5-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, <AS AMENDED) 
The fees and compensation of witnesses in ail civil causes 
must be paid by the party who causes such witnesses to attend, 
and no witness shall be obligated to attend court in a civil 
cause when subpoenaed unless his mileage and fees for one day's 
attendance are tendered or paid to him on demand, nor unless his 
fees for attendance for each day are tendered or paid to him on 
demand. The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be taxed 
as costs against the losing party. 
Section 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED <1953>, AS AMENDED 
The Court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum 
of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse 
party and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or 
defend the action. 
Section 30-3-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS AMENDED <In effect 
at the time of trial) 
<1> When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it such orders in relation to the children, property 
and parties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include in 
every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses 
of the dependent children. If coverage is available at a 
reasonable cost, the court may also include an order requiring 
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for those children. The court shall have 
continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance and health and dental care, or the distribution of 
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation 
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rights of parents, grandparents, and other relatives shall take 
into consideration the welfare of the child. 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse, unless that marriage is annulled and found 
to be void ab initio, in which case alimony shall resume, 
providing that the party paying alimony be made a party to the 
action of annulment and that party's rights are determined. 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse shall be terminated upon application of that party 
establishing that the former spouse is residing with a person of 
the opposite sex, unless it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that the relationship or association between 
them is without any sexual contact. 
Section 78-45-7(4), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953) AS AMENDED 
<4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an 
ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the court shall 
use a uniform statewide assessment formula, adjusted for regional 
differences, prior to rendering the support order. The formula 
shall provide for all relevant factors which can be readily 
identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the 
obligor's earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living 
expenses. The assessment formula shall be established by the 
Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the 
Judicial Council under Subsection 78-3-21(3). 
RULE 52(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 
10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
RULE 54(d), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision 
therefore is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
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rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceedings for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or 
other proceedings for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
RULE 59(a) & (e), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
<a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes: provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimiony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: 
<e) Mgtion^tg^Alter^gr^Amend^a^Judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend a judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
RULE 2.9(b), RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or 
Orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within 5 days after service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Millard County, dated May 17, 1985. 
The Court had previously entered a Decree of Divorce on November 
27, 1964, granting a divorce to the Appellant but reserving the 
remainder of the issues for trial (PL. 232). Following the trial 
on November 27 and 28, 1984, the Court requested both sides to 
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prepare written final arguments as an aid to the Court in 
deciding the issues (PL. 262, 260). The court made a written 
decision on January 28, 1985, deciding all of the issues reserved 
for trial and directing that counsel for Respondents prepare 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree consistent with 
the decision and submit it to counsel for Appellant for approval. 
(PL. 303). The Draft of these documents was mailed to Counsel 
for the Appellant on February 7, 1985 (PL. 324, 333), on 
February 21, 1985. Appellant filed an objection thereto on the 
basis that it did not conform to the Court's Decision. (PL. 
308). Counsel for Appellant submitted, along with his objection, 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Decree felt to be in conformance with the Court's Decision. (PL. 
338, 345). At the same time he filed a Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements. (PL. 310).In a written Ruling dated April 17, 
1985, the Court decided that Respondent's drafts did not follow 
the Court's Decision and directed that counsel for the Respondent 
re-draft the documents essentially in conformance with those 
submitted by Appellant. (PL. 349). In a seperate ruling that 
same date the Court approved all of Appellant's claimed costs 
except those of Certified Business Appraisals, Inc., in the 
amount of $2,531.15. (PL. 353). 
On Hay 28, 1985, following the signing and entry of the 
Judgment and Decree on Hay 20, 1985, Appellant filed a Hotion to 
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Amend Findings, Motion to Amend Judgment, and Notion for New 
Trial pursuant to provisions of Rules 52(b) and 59 (a) and (e), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (PL. 367). No response was made 
thereto. By Minute Entry dated June 19, 1985, the Court denied 
Appellant's motions without comment. (PL.382). 
Appellant moved for summary disposition before this court on 
August 15, 1985. Respondent likewise requested summary 
disposition on August 22, 1985. This Court denied both motions 
on September 11, 1985. 
Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on January 4, 1986, 
on the basis that Appellant had accepted the benefits of the 
decree and therefore was not entitled to an appeal. Oral Argument 
was held on the motion on January 20, 1986, and the motion was 
denied that same date. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial in this matter primarily involved the 
identification and valuation of the marital estate of the 
Appellant and the Respondent Glade Stevens. Some of the farm 
machinery and farm land being utilized in the farming operation 
by the Respondent Glade Stevens, belonged to his father, the 
Respondent Milton Stevens. Each of the respondents testified 
concerning the ownership of and value of numerous items of farm 
and trucking equipment. (TR 30-58, 75-177, 392-449)• They 
presented the testimony of a cousin Ross Stevens, for the same 
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purpose (TR. 188-196). They presented the testimony of Gordon S. 
Ogier, a hay broker, on the value of baled hay. (TR. 188-196). 
They presented the testimony of Bruce Whatcott and LeGrand 
Warner, farm implement dealers, on the value of a combine, a 
windrower, a tractor, a hay hauler, a bale wagon, a diesel truck 
and a silo (TR. 196-205). 
Appellant presented the testimony of a professional business 
appraiser concerning the value of the items of real property and 
machinery utilized on the faming operation and Respondent Glade 
Stevens trucking business, together with the value of the two 
operations as a going concern. (TR 276-392; Ex. 12). There was 
a wide disparity between the values alleged. (Ex 9; Ex 12). 
Further, there was substantial conflict of testimony concerning 
the Respondent Glade Steven's income for the purpose of 
determining an appropriate amount of child support and alimony. 
(TR. 131, 141-143). 
After making it's decision concerning the ownership of the 
property, the Court proceded to divide the marital estate between 
the Appellant and the Respondent Glade Stevens. The Court failed 
to attach a value to any of the items of property divided between 
the parties, failed to make a finding as to the Income of the 
Respondent Glade Stevens, and failed to make a finding concerning 
the value of farming and trucking operations as going concerns 
for purposes of distribution and failed to distribute the farming 
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and trucking businesses to either of the parties. 
Such other facts as may be necessary to a resolution of the 
issues are set forth within the respective arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Appellant's first assigned error is that the 
District Court failed to make specific findings with regard to 
the dollar value of any of the property of the marital estate 
when there was a substantial conflict between the parties. 
Appellant did not prepare the findings signed by the Court and 
did make a motion to amend them. The case of Jones^v^Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) is dispositive of this issue. 
Point II. Appellant's second assigned error is similar to 
the first in that the Court failed to make specific findings with 
regard to the amount of Income being earned by the Husband. This 
finding is necessary in order for this Court to determine the 
adequacy of the child support and alimony awards. The case of 
Montoya^y^Mgntoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985) is dispositive. 
Point III. The third assigned error is that the appellant 
did not receive her fair share of the marital estate. Although 
This court cannot make a final determination of this issue 
without first remanding the case for further findings, two other 
questions within this assigned error should be addressed at this 
time. First the ownership by the marital estate of property 
awarded by the Court to the Husband's parents, and second the 
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distribution of property not mentioned in the findings and 
decree• 
Point IV. The fourth assigned error is that the level of 
child support and alimony is inadequate in light of the entire 
record. Although the District Court failed to make findings 
concerning the husband's income, there is sufficient evidence in 
the record from the husband's tax returns to determine that his 
annual available income, after adding back in the depreciation 
allowance and travel and entertainment expenses, averaged in 
excess of $54,000.00 annaully. 
Point V. The fifth noted error is that the District Court, 
in making its order that the husband provide health and dental 
insurance for the minor children, and requiring the parties to pay 
equally any expenses not covered by the insurance, failed to set 
a maximum on the amount of deductible on the insurance policy, 
thus leaving the wife with the potential for large annual medical 
and dental expenses. 
Point VI. The sixth assigned error is that the District 
Court refused to award either as costs or as part of the 
equitable payment of the divorce litigation expenses the cost of 
obtaining an appraisal of the property in the marital estate. 
The Court refused to make this award on the mistaken belief that 
the Appellant had failed to show that property belonging to the 
husband's parents belonged to the marital estate, when in fact 
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such was not the purpose of the appraisal, which did not appraise 
any of the parents farm land and only minimally any farm 
equipment owned by them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT WRITTEN FINDINGS 
WITH REGARD TO THE VALUE OF EACH OF THE CONTESTED ITEMS 
OF PROPERTY OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
As part of Appellant's Motion to Amend Findings, Motion to 
Amend Judgment, and Motion for New Trial, Appellant requested the 
District Court to make and enter findings concerning the value of 
each item of the parties property as it was required to do when 
there exists a serious question as to the value of one or more of 
the assets. This motion was summarily denied. 
In Jones.Vi,Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985), this 
Court held the following with regard to findings of value in 
property division issues: 
On the present record, we cannot determine whether the 
trial Court distributed the property equitably. In_re 
Marriage_of_Martin, 22 Wash.App. 295, 588 P.2d 1235,^1236 
(1979). To avoid problems of this nature, we require that 
when one of the parties to a property distribution raises a 
serious question as to the value of one or more of the 
assets, the trial Court's distribution of those assets 
should be based upon written findings of fact that will 
permit appellate review. Cf. SbSDSllfiE-YA W9§fe» Utah, 610 
P.2d 1299, 1301 (1980). 
In so deciding this court accepted the general rule in effect in 
the surrounding Western states. See Wilford^v^^Wilford, 699 P.2d 
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105 (Nev. 1985); Lawrence_y ^ Harvey, 607 P.2d 551, (Mont. 1980); 
§SiISX_v^_Bailey, 689 P.2d 216 (Idaho App. 1984). 
However, this Court, in the Jones case, denied the wife her 
requested relief with the following language at 700 P.2d 724-5: 
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife 
and remand for findings on the specific value of the 
assets. In this case, however, the wife's attorney 
prepared the inadequate findings of fact she challenges 
on appeal and the conclusions of law and decree of 
divorce all of which the court entered without 
alteration. Counsel for the wife made no motion to 
have the trial court amend the findings to include 
values. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). The wife cannot 
come now, albeit through new counsel, and complain of 
her own failure to include specific property values in 
the findings of fact. She has waived the claim. 
In the instant case the Appellant's counsel did not prepare 
the findings or decree and did in fact make a motion under Rule 
52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to have them amended to 
Include the valuations. Respondent has argued, however, that 
since Appellant submitted a draft Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, language from which was incorporated into the 
accepted findings, that she is thereby forclosed from complaining 
about the substance of them. (Reply to Motion for Summary 
Disposition, filed with this Court , August 22, 1985). However, 
the Court in Jones stated that both the preparation of the 
findings, and the failure to move to amend, resulted in a waiver 
of the requirement that the court specify values. By implication 
the Court stated that even though her counsel had prepared the 
11 
challenged findings, had there been a motion under Rule 52(b), 
she would have saved her objection. 
In the instant case Appellant's counsel did not prepare the 
offending findings. As part of his objection to the draft 
prpared by counsel for Respondents pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) Rules. 
of Practice in the District and Circuit Courts, findings and 
judgment drafts were submitted because, as stated in the 
Objection, "the deviations [from the written decision] are so 
numerous and occur throughout both document to such an extent" 
that it was simpler to prepare new drafts than to list each 
deficit. (PL. 308)• To the extent that the Court construes that 
the findings ultimately accepted and signed by the lower court 
were prepared by the Appellant, she adequately cured any claim 
that she concurred in those findings by filing her motion under 
Rule 52(b). 
More importantly, however, it should not be held that the 
preparation of the findings in strict conformance with the 
Court's written instructions, results in a finding that the party 
ordered by the court to do so may not thereafter object thereto. 
Such would be an intolerable conclusion. 
Although a motion under Rule 52(b), may be made prior to 
entry of the judgment and may apparently be made in regard to 
"proposed" findings, ZigQS.EiSSt^Stional^Bank^^v^^Clest^Bon 
Venture, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), there is no requirement that 
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it be done in that fashion. Rule 52(b) provides merely that the 
motion be made "not later than 10 days after entry of judgment." 
In the instant case that was done. 
Appellant timely requested that the court make specific 
findings, citing this Court's decision in Jones^v^Jones, §upra. 
There was no objection to that request by the Respondents. Yet 
the Court denied the requested relief. Such refusal was an abuse 
of discretion and the case should be remanded to the District 
Court for entry of appropriate findings. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET A DOLLAR FIGURE ON 
THE RESPONDENT'S INCOME. 
In the Court's ruling, incorporated in the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment and Decrees, the Court 
ordered child support in the sum of $175.00 per month per child 
for each of three children. The Court further awarded the 
Appellant alimony in the sum of $175.00 per month. (PL. 356). 
There was considerable conflict in the testimony concerning 
the Respondent Glade Stevens' income. In addition to his tax 
returns, submitted at trial, (TR. 445; Ex. Un-numbered), 
Appellant testified that occasionally the Respondent Glade 
Stevens received a considerable amount of money in cash which 
went unreported (TR. 275). 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court 
found "that although the income tax returns supplied by the 
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plaintiff on their face may not justify the award of support and 
alimony hereinabove provided, the Court has determined from the 
evidence submitted at the trial, that a substantial amount of 
tax-free income is generated by the plaintiff's activities, and 
that he can afford to pay the sums for support and alimony as 
hereinabove provided." (PL. 358). However, the Court made no 
finding as to what his income actually was. 
As an ancillary to Appellant's argument in her Motion to 
Amend Findings, Motion to Amend Judgment and Motion for New Trial 
that the support order was inadequate (Point IV, infra), 
appellant requested the court to enter a specific finding as to 
the Respondent Glade Stevens' income. (PL. 376-7). The motion 
was summarily denied. (PL.382). 
Following the same logic set forth in Jones^v^^Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), if it is necessary for the trial court to 
set forth its formula for valuing and distributing personal 
property in order to allow for proper appellate review, it is 
also necessary that the trial court establish a figure for income 
of the parties when that is in dispute. Not only is this 
necessary for proper appellate review, but also, for the purpose 
of fixing that figure for possible future modification based upon 
an increase, or decrease in the Respondent's earnings. Without 
knowing the income the Court assessed to the Respondent it is 
impossible to make either determination. 
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In Montgxa_vJL_Mgntgya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985), this court 
recently held that the record was inusuf f icient to allow 
appellate review of the adequacy of support obligations in a 
divorce modification action where the trial court failed to set 
forth its findings as to the exact income of the parties and 
their respective needs. In remanding the matter for further 
findings, the Court reiterated the criteria for determining 
reasonable alimony (and arguably child support) set forth in 
Gramme^v^Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978) and English^v^ 
English, 5fe5 p-2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), as requiring specific 
findings of "the financial condition and needs of the wife, her 
ability to support herself, and the ability of the husband to 
provide support." 696 P.2d at 1195. 
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings in the 
instant case, although specifically asked to do so. It is 
appropriate that the matter be returned to the District Court for 
further findings. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES. 
As set forth in Point I, supra, the trial court refused to 
place a dollar value on each of the items of disputed value. 
Even without such findings, however, it is evident that the trial 
court did not make an equitable distribution. Not only did the 
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Court make erroneous findings concerning the ownership by the 
Appellant and Respondent Glade Stevens of certain items of farm 
equipment and machinery, contrary to the testimony of all the 
witnesses, but the Court completely failed to distribute all of 
the property of the parties, leaving it, de facto, with the 
Respondent Glade Stevens. 
Although the entire question of division of property should 
be remanded to the District Court for the entry of further 
findings, the Court should nonetheless address the question of 
whether the Appellant and Glade Stevens own the disputed farm 
equipment and machinery, or whether it is owned by the 
Respondents Hilton Stevens and Margaret Stevens, and whether 
other BBB^tBp not mentioned in the findings and judgment should 
be divided as part of the marital estate. 
There was considerable dispute in this matter as to the 
identification, ownership and value of numerous items of real and 
personal property, to include ownership and division of the 
farming and trucking businesses. In its written Decision, dated 
January 28, 1985, the Court found that the marital estate 
consisted of "an old and a new home located at Fillmore, each 
with certain household furniture and fixtures, a 1980 
Freigthliner hay truck, two Ford Pickups, and a Ford truck used 
by plaintiff in his farming and business, and a 1980 Mercury 
automobile and twenty acres of land." <PL. 304). Additionally, 
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in dividing the property, the court divided to the Respondent 
Glade Stevens "miscellaneous farm implements and machinery, and 
the benefit of plaintiff's interest in crops that have been 
harvested and are being held for sale or have been sold and other 
income related to his business." (R. 304-305). 
Having divided this property to the Appellant and the 
Respondent Glade Stevens, the Court went on to state that: 
IT]he Defendant has failed to establish that the 
plaintiff. Glade Stevens, has any interest in and to the 
property identified on the "Security Agreement to Hilton 
Stevens" and also the various items items of property listed 
and identified in the plaintiff's "Appraisal Exhibit" 
attached to plaintiff's written summation and there 
identified as "No security agreement items". Although Glade 
Stevens has had the right to use may of the items in his 
farming operations, and has economically benefitted from 
them, there has been no showing that he has any equity 
interest in and to those items to which the defendant has 
any proper claim at this time. 
The Security Agreement mentioned by the Court (Ex. 4), was 
executed, obviously in contemplation of the divorce trial, on 
October 25, 1984, and filed with the State of Utah, UCC 
Department, on November 2, 1984, by the Respondent Glade Stevens 
in favor of his father. Respondent Hilton Stevens, giving him a 
security interest in the following property in the amounts 
stated: 
PROPERTY COST SECURED INTEREST 
Earl Stevens Property 
Bale Wagon, 1068, Ser. No. 1830 
Baler, 467, Ser. No. 563865 
Combine, 6620, Ser. No. 454324 






Windrower 39,400 32,035.00 
Grain Drill, 8200, Ser. No. 051390N 6,085 6,085.00 
Tractor, 2590 Ser. No. 10262694 38,000 18,500.00 
Brown Truck, CA213HL179107 61,000 30,499.00 
International Truck, 20-10 18,000 10,000.00 
Ser. No D1222HGB10043 
Sprinkling System 11,204 -11^.204^00 
Total Secured Amount 6193,005.00 
It clearly appears, therefore, that these items belong to the 
marital estate. There was no need to grant to Hilton Stevens a 
security interest if he already owned the property, as the court 
held. Obviously none of the parties held that opinion. It is 
instructive that the Respondent Glade Stevens claimed each of 
these items of property on his income tax returns as his property 
for purposes of depreciation (EX. Un-numbered)• If there is 
indebtedness on these items, it belongs to the marital estate. 
The other items identified by the trial court as belonging 
to Milton Stevens are as follows: a mower, a gyro mower, a 
harrow, a Danish harrow, a 970 Case Tractor, a cultivator, a John 
Deer rake, and a loader. Appellant does not now dispute those 
claims. But even with the deletion of those items, the total 
marital estate is not significantly diminished. 
In her Written Final Argument, Appellant set forth a side-
by-side columnar comparison of the claimed values of the assetts. 
(PL. 290-4; Addendum)• Appellant's valuation of the marital 
estate was *609,797.00, with liabilities of 6111,100.00 for a net 
estate of $498,697.00. Respondents valuation was £316,386.00 
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with liabilities of $239,253.43 for a net estate of 577,132.57. 
It is quite apparent that in order to arrive at the division the 
Court wade it would have had to accept nearly every value 
submitted by the Respondents and their witnesses as opposed to 
those provided by Appellant's certified appraiser. The division 
is so contrary to the weight of evidence as to be an abuse of 
discretion. 
Regarding credibility, it should be noted by the court that 
both the Respondents Glade Stevens and his father Hilton Stevens 
admitted in court to perjury. Glade admitted that he lied in a 
deposition concerning his keeping of his girl friend in St. 
George. (TR.160). Hilton Stevens admitted, during the second 
day of trial that he lied in the first days trials about the 
price paid for a truck because he had defrauded the State Tax 
Commission in the underpayment of use tax on that vehicle. 
<TR.396-401) 
In addition to the inequitable distribution of the property 
identified by the Court, the Court also erred in not identifying 
and dividing all of the marital estate. Excluding those items of 
farm machinery claimed by the Hilton Stevens, the Court failed to 
list and distribute the following items of personal property by 
name, some of which may fit within the definition of 
miscellaneous farm implements and machinery: 
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ITEM RESPONDENT'S VALUES APPELLANT'S VALUES 
Honda Three-Wheeler $1,300.00 01,600.00 
Grain Drill 3,500.00 13,500.00* 
Crust Buster Plow 1,200.00 1,200.00 
Trailor 6,000.00 «« 
Tractor 300.00 500.00 
Morris Rod Weeder 1,600.00 1,600.00 
Compressor 100.00 100.00 
Ditcher 50.00 50.00 
Hay Lift 2,100.00 2,100.00 
Snowmobile 450.00 450.00 
Children's Savings 4,000.00 3,000.00 
Credit Union Acct 4,000.00 4,000.00 
Debt from Mike Frazier 4,000.00 4,000.00 
Fuel Tank 275^00 275^00 
TOTAL 0 28,695755 0ii,375755 
* Appellant appraised and valued Three Grain Drills used in 
tandem at 04,500.00 each. 
** Respondents appraisal appraised the Tractor in 
conjunction with Freight Liner truck and not seperately. 
Because of the considerable value of these items of personal 
property, far in excess of some of the named items of personal 
property, and because the Court failed to list them in its 
earlier list of marital property, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether or not they were intended to be included within the 
definition of "miscellaneous farm implements and machinery", and 
have already been distributed to the Respondent Glade Stevens. 
Regardless of whether these items of personal property have 
been previously distributed, there is one asset which the Court 
did not address in its opinion, and is not contained in the 
findings and judgment. This is the valuation of the Respondent 
Glade Stevens' farming and trucking businesses as a going 
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concern. Appellant presented expert testimony to the effect that 
regardless of the ownership of items of farming and trucking 
equipment, the farming and trucking business had a value as a 
going concern above the net worth of the assets which could be 
and was appraised. (TR. 311; EX 12, pp. 17-19). In addition to 
the value of the tangible assets. Appellant's expert witness, Hr. 
Thomas 0. Kysar, Certified Business Appraisals Inc., submitted 
an appraisal report which indicated that the businesses had an 
intangible "goodwill" value of 6101,686.00. He testified that 
this figure was arrived at not by reference to the ownership of 
the tangible assets, but by reference to the Respondent's profit 
and loss statements as contained in his income tax returns. (TR. 
300-11>. This is entirely reasonable in that many businesses 
lease all of their equipment or, in service oriented businesses, 
have no tangible assets, but in both cases the businesses do have 
value in and of themselves. 
Mr. Kysar's credentials as a witness were not challenged, 
nor was his testimony concerning the goodwill value of the 
business contradicted by any expert witness provided by the 
Respondents. Respondents presented no evidence concerning the 
value of the businesses. 
As a general rule, business interests acquired subsequent to 
a marriage constitute marital property to be divided between the 
parties even if acquired in the name of one spouse only. 24 Am. 
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Jur. 2d Divgrce_and_S§2gratign Section 900. Cf. Jones^v^^Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Wilfgrd_va_Wilford, 699 P.2d 105 (Nev. 
1985). 
The trucking and farming business have value, if not to a 
potential buyer as established by Appellant's expert, then to 
Respondent Glade Stevens himself as income-producing property. 
Although this Court is not in a position to finally settle 
this matter without referral to the District Court, it can and 
should reverse the trial court's finding that the farming and 
trucking business equipment belonging to Resapondent Hilton 
Stevens (except for those few items of older farm equimpment) and 
direct a finding that they belong to the marital estate. The 
Court should further instruct the District Court to place a value 
on the businesses and to divide the property not previously 
divided. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY ARE INADEQUATE 
IN LIGHT OF THE RECORD AS IT NOW STANDS. 
Although the trial court made no findings as to the 
Respondent Glade Steven's income (Point II, infra), it is 
nonetheless possible to make an appropriate resolution of the 
reasonableness of the amount of support ordered from the record 
in its present configuration. The criteria for determining 
reasonable alimony mret the financial condition and needa of the 
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wife, her ability to support herself, and the ability of the 
husband to provide support. firamme_vi_gram55§,587 P.2d 144, 147 
(Utah 1978); Jones.v^Jones., 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
With regard to her need for support. Appellant testified 
that she has three small children, one of whom was not yet in 
school. Further that she had not worked outside the home since 
the time of marriage and that her employment prior to the 
marriage was only at minimum wage. (TR. 209, 218). 
With regard to her ability to support herself. Appellant 
established, through expert testimony, that she suffered from 
dyslexia and attention deficit disorder, which learning 
disabilites rendered her unable to read above fifth grade level, 
write above fourth grade level, or do math above sixth grade 
level. (TR. 23-24). It was further established that it was not 
due to lack of intelligence which was in the normal range (TR. 
13); That with tutoring and other assistance she could go on to 
college-level work, but that the assistance contemplated would be 
rather costly. (TR. 18-19); that without this assistance it would 
be difficult for her to compete in the marketplace for 
significant employment (TR. 28). 
The only open question was the Respondent Glade Stevens' 
ability to pay support. He testified that his income for the 
year of the trial, 1984, would be less than the previous year, in 
fact would be a net loss, because of the winter kill and raising 
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fuel prices. (TR. 130). The parties tax returns for the years 
1979 through 1983 were admitted at trial (TR. 455; EX. Un-
numbered) • They show the following income, depreciation and 
travel/entertainment expenses: 
FARMING TRUCKING TRAVEL/ 
XIAR SBQS5 BIEBIS BIEBIS IHIERlfilN IQIAL 
1979 S29,184 $9,443 07,709 08,827 055,163 
1980 26,956 13,051 10,615 13,890 64,512 
1981 33,659 17,541 10,615 7,655 53,680 
1982 12,404 18,797 11,673 4,616 47,490 
1983 4,974 21,974 12,732 12,084 51,764 
In each of the preceeding 5 years the Respondent Glade Stevens 
has had available to him in actual usable income an average of 
054,521.80. When cross-examined on what he did with the monies 
not reported as income due to farming and business depreciation, 
he testified that he used it to purchase the two houses. (TR. 
143). Further, the trial court found that there was substantial 
unreported income. (PL. 358). 
It has been held that it is altogether appropriate for the 
trial court to disregard the amount of depreciation claimed on 
property in determining income for the purpose of assessing child 
support or alimony. Smith^v^Smith, 89 Ariz 84, 358 P.2d 183 
(1960); Commonwealth^ex^rel^Rankin^v^^Rankin, 170 Pa. Super. 
570, 87 A.2d 799 (1952). Other cases have held that whether or 
not the husband's net income should be increased by the amount of 
depreciation must be determined on a case by case basis, 
depending on its real effect. WilliS!8§.«Yi
-
j!!iIiiS5§» 175 Pa. 
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Super. 409, 104 A.2d 499 (1954)? Commonweal th^v^Killer, 202 Pa. 
Super. 573, 198 A.2d 373 (1964). 
Because there was no indication that any of the claimed 
depreciation went back into replacing worn-out equipment, but 
rather went into buying the parties homes, the amount of income 
claimed as depreciation must be viewed as income available to use 
for the payment of child support and alimony. 
In 1984 the legislature, in enacting Section 78-45-7(4), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), required that in all temporary 
support orders that the court follow the formula established by 
the Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by 
the Judicial Council. A copy of that chart is in the Addendum. 
With an annual income of in excess of $54,000.00 the Respondent's 
child support should be 6297.00 per child. Although the court is 
not mandated to use that chart in setting child support on a 
permanent basis, it nonetheless provides a practical guide in 
this process. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to set 
the child support at $175.00 per child. 
Likewise, in light of the Appellant's demonstrated need and 
the Respondent Glade Stevens' substantial income, reported and 
unreported, it was an abuse of discretion to set alimony at the 
level of $175.00 per month. An alimony award should, in as far 
as possible, equalize the parties respective standards of living 
and maintain them at a level as cisoe as possible to the standard 
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of living enjoyed during the marriage. Hi3iSX_v..-.Si9l§Z' 676 
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF HEALTH 
AND DENTAL INSURANCE BY THE RESPONDENT GLADE STEVENS IS 
INADEQUATE. 
In the Judgment and Decree the trial court ordered the 
Respondent Glade Stevens to be responsible for maintaining health 
and dental insurance covering the minor children of the parties. 
(PL. 364)• The Court further ordered that any medical and 
dental expenses not covered by insurance be divided equally 
between the parties. This was in furtherance of a legislative 
mandate incorporated in 1984 into Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). The Appellant objected in her Motion To Amend 
Findings, Motion to Amend Judgment and Motion for New Trial to 
the requirement that she be obligated to pay one half of the 
uncovered medical and dental expenses unless the trial court 
should designate the maximum amount of deductible the Respondent 
may have under his Insurance program. (PL. 377). 
The basis for her objection was that if the court did not 
designate the maximum amount of deductible the requirement that 
the Respondent Glade Stevens carry insurance would become 
meaningless except in the case of a major medical catastrophe. 
He would be free to select an insurance program where the annual 
deductible is in excess of 91,000.00 per year per child. This 
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type of program and option is available to the general public. 
Appellant can ill afford paying upwards of 0500 per year on 
medical and dental treatment of each child on the low fixed 
income available to her. 
Although there is merit in the proposition that the 
Appellant can petition the court for relief if the Respondent 
Glade Stevens does in fact purchase such major medical coverage 
in lieu of the more traditional $100.00 deductible policy, the 
court could have short-circuited this necessity by limiting the 
deductible in its judgment. Particularly where that relief was 
requested in the Motion to Amend. This Court should now require 
that that be the order in this case. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REFUSE TO AWARD 
COSTS INCURRED IN OBTAINING AN APPRAISAL OF THE FARMING 
AND TRUCKING BUSINESSES OWNED BY THE PARTIES. 
In its written opinion dated January 28, 1985, the trial 
court made the following award with regard to attorneys fees and 
costs: 
As to the attorneys ferns requested by the defendant, 
the Court will allow the following; $4,000.00 for necessary 
time and efforts spent in connection with discovery and 
preparation for trial of this case. The Court will allow 
the costs of court and the additional expense for hiring Dr. 
Ingram and 6700.00 for the investigator, Tom Proctor. The 
Court is of the opinion that the claims against Milton 
Stevens should not be compensated back to the defendant, 
since it would not be an appropriate precedent where the 
Court does not find that the claims against a third party to 
27 
this proceeding who has been put to considerable expense to 
defend his estate, have been proved. (PL. 306). 
On February 21, 1985, Appellant submitted to the Court a 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, pursuant to Rule 54(d), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming, among other costs, the 
expert witness fees of Certified Business Appraisals, Inc., for 
the testimony and professional appraisal work of one of its 
employees, Thomas 0. Kysar, ASA. (R. 310). The Respondents 
objected to the entire award of costs in an objection dated March 
6, 1985. (R. 313). In a ruling dated April 11, 1985, the Court 
modified its earlier language concerning costs by inserting the 
words "cost of pursuing" before the word •'claims" in the third 
full sentence set forth above so that it now reads: 
•'the Court is of the opinion that the cost_of_pursuing 
claims against Milton Stevens should not be compensated back 
to defendant, since it would not be an appropriate precedent 
where the Court does not find that the claims against a 
third party to this proceeding, who has been put to 
considerable expense to defend his estate, have been 
proved." (PI. 351). 
In another ruling dated the same date, April 11, 1985, the 
trial court approved all of Appellant's costs except those for 
the appraisal. (PL. 353). 
Section 21-5-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, 
provides for the taxation of witness fees as costs. Further, 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, allows 
the court, in divorce actions to order either party to pay sums 
necessary to allow the other party to prosecute or defend the 
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action. This Court has previously held that in an action for 
wrongful death, expert witness fees are not payable under Section 
21-5-8, Utah Code Annotated. Fra8etgn_vJL_«ilson, &05 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1980). The Court cited the lack of specific statutory 
authority for such an award. However, in a divorce action there 
is specific authorization for the Court to make such orders as 
are necessary to allow a matter to be fully litigated. Section 
30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated. This may well include ordering one 
party to pay the costs of experts brought into the court to 
assist the court in making difficult decisions in divorce 
matters. The Courts frequently make these types of orders in the 
area of custody home studies. 
In the instant case the Court did not refuse the requested 
costs on the basis of the reasoning in Frampton_vA_Wilson, supra, 
but rather found that the Appellant's use of the expert witness 
was an attempt to pursue claims against Hilton Stevens, which 
claims were unsuccessful. That was not the purpose and intent of 
the use of the appraiser. The primary use of the appraiser was 
to put a value on all of the property of the marital estate. 
Because there was considerable controversy as to what property 
was and was not part of the marital estate he appraised it all 
and let the court determine who owned what. No real property 
belonging to Hilton and Hargaret Stevens was included within Hr. 
Kysar's appraisal (EX. 12, page 23). The only items of property 
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belonging to Hilton Stevens actually appraised by Mr. Kysar were 
his obsolete farm implements. This is hardly pursuing a claim 
against Mr. Stevens property. 
Further, even had the trial court properly construed the 
purpose for the expert testimony and rejected it outright in 
favor of the testimony of the Respondents, the general rule would 
still allow compensation for this cost. In 20 Am Jur 2d Costs 
Section 65, the rule is stated as follows: 
Where fees of expert witnesses are allowable as costs by 
statute, it has been held that the facts [sic] that the 
expert's opinion was not accepted by the court and that, on 
the issue on which he testified for the defendant, the 
defendant was unsuccessful, are no reason for disallowing 
the fees as costs. 
See Glasg^Vi^Aetna^Casualtx.&.Surety^Cgj, 166 So.2d 552 (La. App. 
1964). 
The Appellant is entitled to costs in this case expended in 
protecting her interest in the marital estate. The only reason 
the claim for the appraisal was rejected was because the 
appraisal did not establish the ownership of certain property by 
the marital estate. However, that was not its purpose. Its 
purpose was to give a value to each item of the estate including, 
most importantly, the value of the farming and trucking 
businesses as going concerns. It is unknown whether the Court 
intentionally failed to address the question of the value of the 
businesses. However, it is clear that they have value. The 
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appraisal was necessary in order to present to the court a guide 
for evaluating the entire marital estate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant is entitled to an order of this Court 
requiring that the entire matter be returned to the District 
Court to complete the fact-finding process. This Court should 
require the District Court to place a specific value on each 
substantial item of property of the marital estate and to state 
the amount of income found to be earned by the Respondent husband 
at the time of the divorce. 
In doing so this Court should first reverse the District 
Court's determination that those items of equipment upon which a 
security interest was placed in contemplation of trial belong to 
the Defendant Hilton Stevens and not the marital estate. The 
Court should also determine that there is a value in the 
farming and trucking businesses and require the Court to value 
and distribute the same, together with the other undistributed 
property. 
This Court should require that the District Court specify 
the level of deductible that the Respondent husband may have on 
his helath and dental insurance, or require the District Court to 
do so. 
Finally, this Court should order that Appellant's costs in 
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obtaining the appraisal of the marital estate be taxed to the 
Respondents. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1986. 
Attorney f6r Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's brief, postage prepaid, to Eldon A. 
Eliason, attorney for Respondents, Box 605, Delta, Utah 64624, 
z< this _J2JL day °* April, 1986. 
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ADDENDUM 
Decision, dated January 28, 1985. 
Ruling, dated April 11, 1985. 
Ruling, dated April 11, 1985. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated May 17, 1985. 
Minute Entry, dated June 19, 1985. 
Uniform Child Support Schedule 
Excerpt from Appellant's Written Final Argument 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE STEVENS, MILTON STEVENS, Civil No. 76 01 
and MARGARET STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. D E C I S I O N 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant. 
This matter was tried to the Court on November 27th and 28th, 
1984, a Decree of Divorce having been heretofore entered and the 
issues reserved for hearing at this time were child custody and 
visitation, child support, alimony and division of property, payment 
of debts, provision for payment of medical and dental expenses of the 
minor children of the parties, and in the Decree continued the terms 
of the interim Order previously entered by the Court to remain in 
effect until the aforesaid issues were resolved. 
The Court now having heard all of the evidence in the case 
relative to the above-issues, now enters its: 
DECISION 
The Court finds that the defendant is a fit and proper person 
to have the primary care, custody and control of the three minor 
/^^^.—^y/' 
children of the parties, subject to the right of the dcfoflderrit to 
visit with said children liberally at reasonable times and places, not 
to interfere with school work or church activities, and upon reasonable 
notice to the defendant as to the time for such visitation. The Court 
also requires that defendant make the children available for extended 
summer visitation with the plaintiff of at least two full weeks, visitatior. 
during the Christmas holiday, and other major holidays to be alter-
nated between the parties from year to year. 
The Court finds that a reasonable sum for the plaintiff to pay 
to the defendant for the support and maintenance of each child is the 
sum of $175.00 per child per month, the same to be payable on the 1st 
and the 15th day of each and every month commencing with the month of 
February, 1985. firfnffiftrrirrt~ provide health and medical insurance for 
the minor children, including dental care. The parties are to split 
uncovered expenses for these items. 
The Court finds that it is reasonable for the plaintiff to pay 
to the defendant alimony in the sum of $175.00 per month, the same 
payable in semi-monthly installments of $87.50 on the 1st and $87.50 
on the 15th day of each and every month. 
The Court finds that the marital assets acquired by the parties 
consist of an old and a new home located at Fillmore, each with certain 
household furniture and fixtures, a 198 0 Freightliner hay truck, two 
Ford Pickups, and a Ford truck used by plaintiff in his farming and 
business, and a 1980 Mercury automobile and twenty acres of land. 
The Court finds that a proper distribtuion of the marital assets 
should be as follows: 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
The new home, together with all household furniture, fixtures, 
and appliances therein. The balance of the mortgage or lien against the 
home is to be paid and discharged by the plaintiff. The Court also awards 
the defendant the 198 0 Mercury automobile, the same to be free and clear 
from debt or such debt as is on the vehicle assumed by the plaintiff. 
TO THE PLAINTIFF; 
The old home and contents, the Ford pickup trucks and the Ford 
truck, as well as the 1980 Freightliner, and any other miscellaneous 
farm implements and machinery, and the benefit of plaintiff's interest in 
crops that have been harvested and art being held for sale or have been 
sold and other income related to his business. The plaintiff is also 
entitled to the twenty acres of farm land he owns with another individual. 
The plaintiff is required to pay and discharge all the debts of 
the parties, whether related to business activities or against other 
items hereinabove distributed. Other debts incurred by either party 
during the course of separation shall be paid and discharged by the 
party incurring same. The Court finds that the defendant has failed 
to establish that the plaintiff, Glade Stevens, has any interest in 
and to the property identified on the "Security Agreement to Milton 
Stevens" and also the various items of property listed and identified 
in the plaintiff's "Appraisal Exhibit" attached to plaintiff's 
written summation and there identified as "No security agreement items". 
Although Glade Stevens has had the right to use many of the items in 
his farming operations, and has economically benefitted from them, 
there has been no showing that he has any equity interest in and to 
those items to which the defendant has any proper claim at this time. 
Other claims that the plaintiff owns other real estate in Fillmore 
and St. George, have not been established. The Court further finds that 
although the income tax returns supplied by plaintiff, on their face may 
not justify the award of support and alimony hereinabove provided, the 
Court in hearing the evidence determined that a substantial amount of 
tax-free income seems to be generated by said plaintiff's activities, 
and that he can afford to pay the sums as support and alimony which have 
been hereinabove provided for. 
As to the attorneys fees requested by the defendant, the Court 
will allow the following; $4,000.00 for necessary time and efforts 
spent in connection with discovery and preparation for trial of this 
case. The Court will allow the costs of court and the additional 
expense for hiring Dr. Ingram and $700.00 for the investigator, Tom 
Proctor. The Court is of the opinion that the claims against Milton 
Stevens should not be compensated back to the defendant, since it would 
not be an appropriate precedent where the Court does not find that the 
claims against a third party to this proceeding who has been put to 
considerable expense to defend his estate, have been proved*, 
Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree in accordance with the above and fore-
going Decision, the same to be submitted to counsel for the defendant 
for his approval as to form and content consistent with the above and 
forgoing Decision, then to the Court for signing and entry. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah, this >. o day of January, 
1985. 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE STEVENS, MILTON Civil No. 7601 
STEVENS and MARGARET 
STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. R U L I N G 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant. 
The objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree filed by counsel for defendant having been reviewed by the 
Court, and the objections of plaintiffs to defendant's Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements having been reviewed by the Court, the 
Court now Rules on the objections as follows: 
As to the objections of plaintiffs to the findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree the Court Rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's objection to paragraph 1 of the Findings 
of Fact is well-taken and that prepared by counsel for plain-
tiffs is Ordered stricken and the Court adopts the Findings 
of Fact prepared by counsel for defendant to cover care, 
custody and control of the children as well as visitation. 
2. The Court finds that the last sentence of said 
paragraph 2 should read: "In addition thereto, the 
plaintiffs shall provide health and medical insurance 
for the minor children, including dental care and the 
parties shall divide equally any uncovered expenses for 
these items, 
3. This paragraph is consistent with the Court's 
Decision. 
4. The Court Orders that the first full paragraph 
of paragraph 4 at page 4 be stricken (the paragraph reads: 
"The Court finds from the evidence adduced that there is a 
substantial amount of indebtedness and liens against both 
the homes, truck and vehicles." With this deletion the 
language of the balance of paragraph 4 substantially com-
plies with the Decision of the Court and may be incor-
porated into the final findings. 
5. Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the Proposed Findings 
of plaintiffs are approved and may be incorporated into 
the final Findings to be adopted by the Court. 
6. The Court finds that paragraph 8 submitted by 
plaintiffs is not consistent with the Court's Decision 
and directs that paragraph 5 submitted by counsel for 
the defendant be adopted as the appropriate finding on 
this issue to be incorporated in the final Findings to 
be adopted by the Court. 
7. The Court finds that paragraph Nos. 9, 10/ and 11 
of the Findings submitted by plaintiffs are substantially 
in conformity with the Court's Decision and should be 
adopted and entered as Findings in the final Findings of 
Fact adopted by the Court. 
As to the language of paragraph 11 of the plaintiffs1 
proposed Findings the Court intended that the third full 
sentence of the second full paragraph on page 4 of the 
Court's Decision should have read as follows: 
"The Court is of the opinion that the cost of 
pursuing claims against Milton Stevens should not be 
compensated back to defendant, since it would not be 
an appropriate precedent where the Court does not 
find that the claims against a third party to this 
proceeding, who has been put to considerable expense 
to defend his estate, have been proved." 
Counsel for plaintiffs in preparing the final Findings may provide 
in paragraph 11 language consistent with the intent of the Court in that 
sentence to be talking of costs of pursuing claims, rather than the 
claims themselves. 
Based upon the foregoing Ruling, the Court directs that counsel 
for the plaintiffs prepare a new set of Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree based upon the aforesaid changes in the 
Findings of Fact, the same to be incorporated into the Conclusions of 
Law and Decree in this matter. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah, this (t day of April, 1985. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE STEVENS, MILTON Civil No. 7601 
STEVENS and MARGARET 
STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. R U L I N G 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant. 
The defendant having filed a Memorandum of Costs and Disburse-
ments, to which the plaintiffs have filed an objection and the Court 
having fully reviewed the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements as 
well as its Decision relative to costs, and the objections filed by 
plaintiffs, now settles the matter of costs as follows: Items 10/3/83 
covering the filing fee of Answer and Counterclaim is allowed. 
Item 11/30/83 Milton B. Steven's Subpoena is allowed. 
Item 2/3/84 Millard County Sheriff, Service of subpoena is allowed. 
Item 2/27/84 Tipton Reporting Service, Depositions, Milton 
Stevens, Sr. and Glade Stevens for $189.00 is allowed. 
Item 5/ 17/84 Millard County Clerk, Order to Show Cause, 
$5.00 is allowed. 
Item 5/21/84 Myron Frazier, preparation of transcript, $17.00, 
is allowed. 
Dr. Greg Ingram, witness & Travel, $250.00 is allowed. 
Certified Business Appraisals, Inc. appraisal & expert 
witness fee, $2,531.15 disallowed. 
Proctor Investigations & Consuling, Inc., $700.00 allowed. 
TOTAL FOR ALL COSTS ALLOWED: $1,224.55. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah, this / f day of April, 1985. 
GEO RGEt^ E. BALLIF, JUD( 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
'Attorney for Plaintiff 
Box 605 
Delta, Utah 84624 
864-2515 
t[^ ° - • y 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
, GLADE STEVENS, MILTON-
STEVENS, MARGARET STEVENS, 
i Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT ana CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No ^60: 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on November 
!27th and 28th, 1984. The Court had theretofore entered a decree J 
i 
of divorce reserving for the time of the trial the issues of j 
child custody and visitation, child support and alimony, division , 
of property, payment of debts, provisions for payment of medical 
and dental expenses for the minor children of the parties, and 
continued the terms of the terms of the interim order previously 
entered by the Court. The Court having heard the evidence presentee 
I 
f 
;by the parties, having reviewed the exhibits submitted by the par-
ities and having considered the final written arguments submitted 
in lieu of oral arguments and summation, now makes and enters 
|the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
In addition to the Findings of Fact made and entered pre-
viously in this same matter, the Court Finds: 
1. The defendant Ellen I. Stevens is a fit and proper person 
to have the care, custody and control of the three minor children 
* 
i 
of the parties, subject to the right of the plaintiff to visita-
\ 
\ 
tion with the said children liberally and at reasonable times j 
, and places, not to interfere with school work or church activities 
J and upon reasonable notice to the defendant as to the time for j 
i such visitation. The plaintiff is further granted extended sum- j 
t t 
! t 
; mer visitation with the minor children of the parties for a per- } 
» » 
i iod of two weeks or such longer period as the parties may mutually 
agree to. Plaintiff shall be entitled to visitation with the j 
minor children of the parties on every other major holiday each 
| year, the holidays to be alternated between the parties from year » 
| to year. Such holidays are New Years Day, Memorial Day, July 4th,1 
i ! 
! July 24th, Labor Day and Thanksgiving and Christmas. [ 
; » 
I 2. The Court finds that a reasonable sum for the plaintiff to J 
pay to the defendant for the support and maintainance of each
 { 
child is the sum of $175 per child per month, the same to be 
payable on the first and fifteenth day of each and e/ery month 
, commencing with the month of February, 1985. In addition thereto^ 
the plaintiff shall provide health and medical insurance for the j 
! minor children, including dental care, and the parties shall * 
divide equally any uncovered expenses for these items. 
3. The Court further finds that it is reasonable for the plain-
tiff to pay to the defendant alimony in the sum of $175 per month< 
the same to be payable in two semi-monthly installments of $87.50 
on the first and the fifteenth of each and every month. 
-2-
*4 . The Court finds from the evidence adduced that there is a 
substantial amount of indebtedness including liens against the 
.homes, truck and vehicles. 
The Court finds that the proper distribution of the marital 
assets should be as follows: 
To the defendant: The New Home, together with all household 
furniture, fixtures and appliances therein. The balance of the 
mortgage or lien against the home is to be paid or discharged by 
jthe plaintiff. The 1980 Mercury automobile, the same to be free 
and clear from debt or such debt as is on the vehicle, assumed by 
.the plaintiff, 
j To the plaintiff: The Old Home and contents, the Ford Pickup j 
! i 
! o ! 
trucks and the Ford Truck as well as the 1980 Freightliner and any' 
I I 
{other miscellaneous farm implements and machinery, and the benefit 
I i 
'of the parties1 interest in the crops that have been harvested j 
and are being held for sale or have been sold and all other income 
related tohis business. The plaintiff is also entitled to all J 
of the equity in the 20 acres of farm land being purchased from 
! 
Earl Stevens. ! 
1 
I 
5. The Court finds that the plaintiff should be required to pay 
and discharge all of the debts of the parties, whether related to 
business activities or against other items hereinabove distributed. 
Other debts incurred by either party during the course of separa- ! 
tion shall be paid and discharged by the party incurring said 
debt. I 
6. The Court finds that defendant has failed to establish
 : 
that the plaintiff Glade Stevens has any interest in and to the 
and also the various items of property listed and identified in j 
!plaintifffs exhibit No. D, and identified as No Security Agree- I 
i i 
pent Items. j 
) 
The Court finds that although Glade Stevens, plaintiff herein ! 
j 
has had the right to use many of the items in his farming opera- i 
tion and has economically benefited from them, there has been no 
showing that he has any equity interest in and to those items to I 
I 
which the defendant has any proper claim at this time. < 
7. The Court further finds: that other claims registered by the ! 
defendant that the plaintiff owns other real estate in Fillmore and 
jSt. George or elsewhere have not been established. j 
8. The Court finds that although the income tax returns supplied 
(by the plaintiff on their face may not justify the award of support 
I i 
; ! 
•and alimony hereinabove provided, the Court has determined from ; 
the evidence submitted at the trial, that a substantial amount of jl 
•tax-free income is generated by the plaintiff's activities, and 
j 
!that he can afford to pay the sums for support and alimony as 
(hereinabove provided. 
i j 
9- The Court finds that it is reasonable to award $4000 total 
attorney fees as compensation for the necessary time, efforts, ! 
land expenses of defendant and her attorney in the discovery and 
spresentation of the case. The Court further finds that it is I 
j ! 
[reasonable to award expense for the hiring of Dr. Ingram and that ; 
j 
jhis medical services be paid by the plaintiff herein. 
j 10. The Court further finds that the payment of $700 for an 
{investigator lorn Proctor, be allowed to the defendant, 
i -4-
11. The Court finds that the cost of pursuing claims against 
Milton Stevens should not be compensated back to defendant, since 
it would not be an appropriate precedent where the Court does not 
find that the claims against a third party to this proceeding, 
who has been put to considerable expense to defend his estate, 
have been proved. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court, based on the said Findings of Fact makes the follow-
ing Conclusions of Law: 
1. A Decree of Divorce having been previously granted and 
filed effective upon filing the 15th day of November, 1984. The 
Court further concludes that the defendant is entitled to primary 
care, custody and control of the three minor children of the par-
ties, subject to the right of the plaintiff to visitation with 
the said children liberally and at reasonable times and places, 
not to interfere with school work or church activities and upon 
reasonable notice to the defendant as to the time for such visit-
ation. The plaintiff is further granted extended summer visitati 
with the minor children of the parties for a period of two weeks 
or such longer period as the parties may mutually agree to. 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to visitation with the minor children 
of the parties on every other major holiday each year, the holi-
days to be alternated between the parties from year to year. 
Such holidays are New Years Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 
24th, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
2. The Court concludes that it is reasonable for the plaintiff 
to pay to the defendant for the support and maintainance of each 
child the sum of $175 per month, the same to be payable on the 
first and fifteenth day of each and every month, commencing with 
the month of February, 1985. In addition thereto, the plaintiff 
shall provide health and medical insurance for the minor children 
including dental care, and the parties shall divide equally any 
uncovered expenses for these items. 
3. The Court concludes that the plaintiff should pay to the 
defendant alimony in the sum of $175 per month, the same to be 
payable in two semi-monthly installments of $87.50 on the first 
and the fifteenth of each and every month. 
4. The Court concludes that the proper distribution of the 
marital assets should be as follows: 
To the defendant: The New Home, together with all household 
furniture, fixtures and appliances therein. The balance of the 
mortgage or lien against the home is to be paid or discharged by 
the plaintiff. The 1980 Mercury automobile, the same to be free 
and clear from debt or such debt as is on the vehicle, assumed 
by the plaintiff. 
To the plaintiff: The Old Home and contents, the Ford Pickup 
trucks and the Ford Truck as well as the 1980 Freightliner and 
any other miscellaneous farm implements and machinery, and the 
benefit of the parties' interest in the crops that have been 
harvested and are being held for sale or have been sold and all 
other income related to his business. The plaintiff is also 
entitled to all of the equity in the 20 acres of farm land being 
purchased from Earl Stevens. 
5. The plaintiff should be required to pay and discharge all 
of the debts of the parties, whether related to business activi-
ties or against other items hereinabove distributed. Other debts 
incurred by either party during the course of separation shall be 
paid and discharged by the party incurring such debt. 
6. The defendant has failed to establish that the plaintiff 
Glade Stevens has any interest in and to the property identified 
on the security agreement to Milton Stevens and also the various 
items of property listed and identified in plaintiff's Exhibit 
D, and identified as No. Security Agreement Items. 
Although Glade Stevens, plaintiff herein has had the right to 
use many of the items in his farming operation and has economi-
cally benefited from them, there has been no showing that he has 
any equity interest in and to those items to which the defendant 
has any proper claim at this time. 
7. Other claims registered by the defendant that the plaintiff 
owns other real estate in Fillmore and St. George or elsewhere 
have not been established. 
8. It is reasonable to award $4000 total attorney fees as 
compensation for the necessary time, efforts, and expenses of 
defendant and her attorney in the discovery and presentation of 
this case. The medical services of Dr. Ingram should be paid 
by the plaintiff herein. 
9. The payment of $700 for an investigator Tom Proctor should 
also be paid by the plaintiff. 
Dated this f] day of 
-, 1985. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of th 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law postage prepa 
this ^1/ day of April, 1985 to Donald R. Jensen, MCCULLOUGH, 
& JENSEN, 930 South State, Suite 10, Orem, Utah 8^058. 
xM<J '/- /ff* 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
In and For W& County 
MILLARD 
GLADE STEVENS, MILTON STEVENS, 
and MARGARET STEVENS, 
Plaintiff 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 7601 
ELLEN I. STEVENS, 
Defendant 
DATED June 19, 1985 
George E. Ball i f JUDGE 
This matter came before the court in accordance with Rule 2.8 
of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts and the court having con-
sidered the matter now enters its 
R U L I N G 
Defendant's motion to amend Findings, motion to amend Judgment 
and Motion for New Trial is denied. 
Dated this « ^ ^ day of June, 1985. 
Copies to: Eldon A. Eliason 
Donald R. Jensen 
Box 605, Delta, Utah 84624 
930 S. State St., Suite 10, Orem, Ut. 
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Kysat of Certified Business Appraisals, Inc., concerning the 
value of the homes of the parties, the 20 acres of farn land 
titled in the joint nan.es of the parties, the farn.ing and 
trucking equipment, the finished hay and the intangible 
"goodwill" value of the businesses identified as the farming and 
trucking businesses, together with the liabilities owed by the 
parties. 
With respect to each of these items there is some difference 
between the parties as to the appropriate value of each item, and 
the amount of the liabilities. I shall attempt to set forth 
these differences to aid the Court in making its decision with 
regard to these matters. 
ASSETS 
HEU 
1979 Freightliner tractor/trlrs 
Hesston Windrower/Cutter 
Mower 
5' Gyro Mower 
Harrow 
Danish Harrow 
1070 (970) Case Tractor 
Honda 3-Wheeler 
New Holland hay hauler (Bale Wagon) 
Alumax 7' Sprinkling System 
1. Opinion offered by Mr. Ogier in comparison to his own truck. 
2. Opinion of Mr. Warner based on comparison from book. 
3. Testimony of Plaintiff's father that it is worthless and 
belongs to him 
4. Testimony of Plaintiff's father, and that it belongs to him. 
5. Plaintiff's original testimony valued this piece at $1,250.00 
but his later testimony placed it at $1,300.00. 
6. Plaintiff offered no evidence as to value. 
11 
PLAINT'S VALUE 
$24 ,000 .00 . 1 
1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ^ 
•°~3 
- 0 - 3 
- 0 - 3 
4 6 1 . 0 0 * 
3 ,800 .00 c 4 
1 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 ^ 
3 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ^ 
6 
P E f ' S VALUE 
$39 ,000 .00 
2 8 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 
800 .00 
3 0 0 . 0 0 
3 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 
8,000.00 
1 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
3 0 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 . 
4 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 7 
LOUGH I 
LJENStN i 
ITm PLAINT'S VALUE DEF'S VALUE 
1983 Case Tractor/Disc 30,350.00° 26,500.00 
2-Ton Truck (International) 8,000.009 30,000.00 
2-Ton Truck (Ford) ±0 20,000.001:L 
22'Mobile Home J* 3f000.00 
3 Grain Drills $3,500.00*3 $13f500.0014 
Cultivator -0-3 550.00 
2 Utility trailers ^ 4,000.0015 
1976 Ford Pick Up 2,100.00j° 1,500.00 
New Holland Kay Baler 8,000.00*7 5,600.00 
Crustbuster Plow 1,200.0018 1,200.00 
Farmall F236 Tractor 1 0 2,000.00 
2 John Deere Twin Rakes 5,300.00^ 5,300.00 
Diesel Tractor (operates pump) 300.0019 500.0019 
7. Based upon the evidence of Mr. Ross Stevens Defendant accepts 
that the system belongs only half to the Plaintiff and now 
reduces the value to $4,400.00. 
8. Plaintiff's original testimony. The list presented on the 
second day of trial placed the value at $26,500.00 without 
explaining the difference. 
9. Appraisal by Plaintiff and by Mr. Warner. 
10. Plaintiff denies the existence of this item. 
11. Mr. Kysar testified that the truck was present on the 
premises on both visits. Plaintiff offered no explanation 
for the truck nor denied that it was present. 
12. Plaintiff claims that the trailer belongs to a Mr. Robert De 
Loge. However he presented nothing other than his testimony. 
He admitted that the trailer he is now living in the trailer 
is located on his father's farm and he lives in it. 
13. Plaintiff lists only 1 grain drill. In his second list he 
values it at $3,500.00 with no explanation. He did not deny 
the existence of the other 2 grain drills. 
14. Mr. Kysar viewed and appraised 3 grain drills used in tandem. 
15.Mr. Kysar viewed and appraised 2 utility trailers. Compare' 
Plaintiff's First answer to Interrogatories, page 3, #5 where 
he lists a 1981 utility trailer purchased in 1981 for $21,200 
with a present value of $9,000. 
16. Plaintiff's second value sheet lists the price at $1,500.00 
with no explanation as to the difference. 
17.Plaintiff's second value sheet lists the value at $5,600, 
accepting Mr. Kysar's valuation. 
18. Plaintiff did not list it on his original sheet. 
19.Mr. Ross Stevens testified that this tractor was half his. 


























John Deere Combine 
Sioux Silo 
1980 Mercury Cougar 
1978 1/2-Ton Truck 






Plaintiff's 2d Pickup 
Furniture and Appliances 
Snowmobile 
1980 Monte Car lo 
C h i l d r e n ' s s av ings 
C r e d i t Union Account 
New Home 
Old Home 
Canyon Road Home 
20 Acres (Ear l Stevens land) 
PLAINT'S VALUE 






























































20. Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Whatcott appraised it at $37,472.00. 
21. Defendant accepts Mr. Ross Steven's testimony that one of the 
combines appraised by Mr. Kysar belongs to him and thus 
reduces her claim to $38,400. 
22. Appears on both of Plaintiff's lists. 
23. Plaintiff is unable to explain this entry. Mr. Kysar could 
not identify where he obtained this entry. Plaintiff is 
willing to admit that no such truck exists. 
24. This item appears on Plaintiff's first list. Defendant did 
not have it appraised but accepts Plaintiff's valuation. 
25. This is the car being driven by Plaintiff's girlfriend which 
Plaintiff claims is a gift or loan from his friend Glen 
Kenworthy. 
26. There was a difference in the testimony of the parties on 
this account. 
27. Not discussed at trial but should be divided. 
28. Plaintiff's estimate. 
29. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t he was owed 
$4,000.00 on t h i s home by Mike F r a z i e r . 



































Fin i shed Hay-
Cash in Bank 
Account ' s r e c e i v a b l e 
PLAINT'S VALIIE 





, , 4 7 , 3 5 2 . 0 0 ^ 
" 29,154.0033 
3 4
 1 7 , 0 4 0 . 0 0 3 4 
2 5
 l £ lx i£^£ 0 3 5 
$316,386.00 $609,797.00 
UEU 
1979 F r e i g h t l i n e r t r a c t o r / t r l r s 
PLAINT'S £LAI£ 
$30,499.00 
31 . Based on agreement by P l a i n t i f f t o s e l l 200 tons t o Mr. Ogier 
a t $50.00 per t on . Defendant f e e l s t h a t t h i s was ano the r of 
P l a i n t i f f ' s f a l s i f i c a t i o n s . 
32 . T h i s amount of hay was a c t u a l l y v i ewed by Mr. K y s a r , i t 
appea r s in the pho tographs , a l l but one s t ack of which i s 3 -
w i r e b a i l s . Mr. Ross Stevens t e s t i f i e d t h a t any 3 -wi re b a i l s 
b e l o n g e d t o t h e P l a i n t i f f . Mr. K y s a r ' s v a l u a t i o n i s ba sed 
upon t e s t i m o n y o t h e r t h a n t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s and h i s f r i e n d s . 
I t was c o n f i r m e d by t h e p e r s o n t o whom P l a i n t i f f s e l l s h i s 
hay . 
3 3 . P l a i n t i f f d e n i e d t h a t t h i s was an a s s e t . But s e e h i s F i r s t 
Answer t o I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , p . 8, *24. P l a i n t i f f ' s t e s t imony 
was s o m e t h i n g t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i f i t was b e i n g h e l d as 
s e c u r i t y f o r h i s m o r t g a g e on t h e new home i t was n o t an 
a s s e t . The market va lue was g r e a t e r than the book v a l u e . 
3 4 . T h i s f i g u r e was o b t a i n e d from P l a i n t i f f and from His F i r s t 
Answer t o I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . Although P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
some of t h e s e accoun t s r e c e i v a b l e are in bankruptcy , the only 
e v i d e n c e i s c h a p t e r 13 f i l i n g s which have been d i s m i s s e d . 
The debt i s s t i l l t h e r e . 
35.The goodwi l l va lue i s a func t ion of d i s c r e t i o n a r y cash , l e s s 
r e t u r n on inves tmen t t imes the r i s k f a c t o r m u l t i p l i e r . This 
was adequa te ly d i s c u s s e d by Mr. Tom Kysar. P l a i n t i f f den ie s 
t h a t t h e r e i s any v a l u e i n h i s b u s i n e s s ; t h a t he h a s no 
g u a r a n t e e t h a t he can c o n t i n u e w o r k i n g in h i s b u s i n e s s ; and 
t h a t he i s n e a r l y bankrup t . 
36. I have on ly l i s t e d t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m of l i a b i l i t i e s . 
Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h a t t he l i a b i l i t i e s a r e those given t o 
Mr. Kysar by t h e P l a i n t i f f , or a t most t h o s e c l a i m e d in t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s * R e s p o n s e t o D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o c o m p e l 
d i s c o v e r y and made an e x h i b i t a t t r i a l . 
14 
tcCULLOUGH 
































5' Gyro Mower 
Harrow 
Danish Harrow 
1070 (970) Case Tractor 
New Holland hay hauler (Bale Wagon) 
1983 Case Tractor/Disc 
2-Ton Truck (International) 
3 Grain Drills 
1976 Ford Pick Up 
New Holland Hay Baler 
2 John Deere Twin Rakes 
John Deere Combine 
Loader 
Plaintiff's 2d Pickup 
1980 Monte Carlo 
New Home 
Old Home 
20 Acres lEarl t » AL CLAf^lBSLIABILITIES 
(Questioned l i a b i l i t i e s ) 
TOTAL IF ALLOWED 
PLAINT'S CLMM 
32,035.00TZ 
( - 0 - ) 3 8 
( - 0 - ) 3 8 
( - 0 - ) 3 8 
( 4 6 1 . 0 0 ) 3 8 
(3 ,800.00) 3 8 
21,742 .00 3 9 




12 ,333 .00 4 J 
( 5 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 ) 3 8 
40 ,000 .00_ o ( 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 3 8 
4 5 0 . 0 0 , . 




I f t h e C o u r t a c c e p t s t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n i n i t s 
e n t i r e t y , s u b t r a c t i n g t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s r e p o r t e d l i a b i l i t i e s of 
$111,100 from h i s d e m o n s t r a t e d a s s e t s , of $609,797 i t l e a v e s a 
37 . Only $13,965 claimed in Response t o Motion t o Compel. 
3 8 . I f t h e C o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s i t e m b e l o n g s t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r , t hen i t s h o u l d e i t h e r n o t be c o u n t e d 
above as an a s s e t or should be deducted here as a l i a b i l i t y . 
39 . Only $9,000.00 claimed in Response t o Motion t o Compel. 
40 . P l a i n t i f f a l s o c l a i m s t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l $13 ,000.00 i s due 
f o r r e p a i r s t o t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n . No d o c u m e n t a t i o n was 
p r o v i d e d fo r t h e s e c l a i m e d r e p a i r s . F u r t h e r , P l a i n t i f f 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he breakdown occurred about 2 weeks p r i o r t o 
t h e t r i a l , a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g on t h e d i v o r c e . I f t h e r e i s 
such a l o s s i t i s e n t i r e l y the P l a i n t i f f ' s . 
4 1 . Only $7,633.00 claimed in Response t o Motion t o Compel. 
4 2 . I f t h e C o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s i t e m b e l o n g s t o Mr. 
Kenworthy t h e n i t s h o u l d e i t h e r n o t be c o u n t e d above a s an 
a s s e t or should be deducted here as a l i a b i l i t y . 
4 3 . Only $7,272.47 claimed in Response t o Moition t o Compel. 
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